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PROTECTING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION IN
ILLINOIS: A RESPONSE TO THE ILLINOIS TRADE
SECRETS ACT FROM A DRAFTING PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
In today's high-technology society, businesses spend vast amounts of time,
money, and other resources on research and development and gathering valua-
ble information.1 In an age of shrinking profit margins and increasing deregu-
lation, businesses have begun to take effective measures to protect their com-
petitive advantages by securing the confidentiality of this information.
Competing against this consideration is the increased mobility or transience of
a work force that may misappropriate this information, negligently or inten-
tionally, to its own advantage.'
Research and innovation play prominent roles in the maintenance of our
healthy economy.3 Throughout history, developers of high-technology systems
and otherwise commercially valuable items have sought advice about how they
may keep these achievements to themselves and away from their rivals. The
law has responded to these concerns with the classification of various types of
information according to the level of proprietary interest an individual has in
the particular information. One classification of confidential information is a
trade secret,4 the definition of which will be discussed in great detail later in
this Comment. However, some information, not rising to the level of trade
secret status, also may have its confidentiality protected pursuant to a binding
contractual agreement between two parties. This type of agreement is com-
1. Cf. Kenneth J. Hautman & Rose A. Sullivan, Intellectual Property: Maximizing Protection
of an Employer's Rights, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 253, 253 (1989) (cautioning that because these
valuable assets provide an employer with a competitive advantage, it is vital that employers ex-
plore the means by which they may protect their information).
2. William J. McCabe, Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies
Adequate?, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1972) (suggesting that Florida impose more stringent sanc-
tions against trade secret misappropriators).
3. See, e.g., Jane H. Cutaia, Reheating Slowly but Surely, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 74
(commenting that the chemical industry's expenditures on research and development in 1992
would increase five percent from expenditures of three billion dollars in 1991); James Flanijan,
Why Savings on Defense May Not Help the Economy, L.A. TIMES. Jan. 19, 1992, at DI (noting
that defense expenditures on research would be relatively undisturbed by a decrease in defense
spending generally); Barbara Rudolph, A Quick Fix is Not Enough, TIME, Jan. 13, 1992, at 39
(suggesting that to stimulate the economy the federal government should stimulate private invest-
ment in research and development).
4. Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 277 (1980). In
the intellectual property field, there are two sources of law that may be used to protect commer-
cially valuable information. The first source is patent law, a creature of federal statute. Id. The
second is trade secret law-the topic of this Comment-which is relegated to state law. Id.
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monly referred to as a "nondisclosure agreement" or a "confidentiality agree-
ment."5 This Comment will focus on how one may protect confidential infor-
mation and what implications the newly enacted Illinois Trade Secrets Act
("ITSA" or the "Act") may have on the protection of confidential information
in Illinois.
A good working definition of a trade secret is found in the Restatement of
Torts.' The United States Supreme Court quoted the definition in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,' saying, "A trade secret may consist of any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors,
who do not know or use it." 8 However, one should be wary of any single defini-
tion of a trade secret. Because trade secret protection is sought for matters
ranging from chemical formulae 9 to customer lists,lo a precise definition en-
compassing all possible exigencies is impossible.1
Once a trade secret is defined, trade secret law provides a cause of action
against one who improperly uses or attempts to use another's secret "know-
how."" Trade secret law protects trade secrets by guarding them against mis-
appropriation.13 Once material has been classified as a trade secret, the owner
of the trade secret may enlist the aid of the courts in protecting it.' 4
This Comment will examine the protection of trade secrets under the re-
cently enacted ITSA. The examination will begin with an overview of the de-
velopment of trade secret laws. The origins of trade secret doctrine will be
traced from early English common law to the birth of trade secret protection
in the United States, and then to its introduction to aid development in Illi-
nois. Next, the Comment will analyze the struggle in Illinois to provide a
5. See, e.g., Label Printers v. Pflug, 564 N.E.2d 1382 (Il. App. Ct. 1991) (nondisclosure
agreement); Gillis Associated Indus. v. Cari-All Inc., 564 N.E.2d 881 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
6. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939); see infra text accompanying notes 64-96 (describing
the Restatement definition and its application in Illinois).
7. 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974). Definitions of trade secrets were developed independently in
each of the fifty states. Kewanee is important because the Court defined a trade secret in a way
that allowed the states to develop a uniform state trade secret law.
8. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. e (1939)).
9. See, e.g., Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 NE. 806 (II1. 1921) (owner of a chemical plant
unsuccessfully seeking to protect his formula for a chemical compound).
10. Prentice Medical Corp. v. Todd, 495 N.E.2d 1044 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (protecting a cus-
tomer list as a trade secret); cf. Brostron v. Warmann, 546 N.E.2d 3 (III. App. Ct. 1989) (holding
that a customer list was not a protectable trade secret).
11. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01, at 2-3 (1990) (suggesting that
because the range of items that may be trade secrets is so diverse, examples may be more useful in
understanding what constitutes trade secrets than Iany attempt to codify or define them).
12. Id.
13. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
14. Typically this aid will take the form of an injunction prohibiting a third party from disclos-
ing or using his trade secret. For cases in which injunctions were issued in trade secret matters,
see ILG Industries v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393 (II1. 1971); Televation Telecommunication Systems,
Inc. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (I11. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 266 (II1. 1990);
and Colony Corp. of America v. Crown Glass Corp., 430 N.E.2d 225 (I11. App. Ct. 1981).
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workable definition of a trade secret, a definition that might provide the own-
ers of trade secrets direction in their quest to protect their secrets. The bases
in tort and contract in which common law actions for recovery for misuse of a
trade secret lie will be discussed.
The Comment will then present and explain the recently adopted ITSA.
ITSA will be discussed in a section-by-section fashion. This Comment will
analyze the definitions in ITSA, its provisions for remedies, and how the Illi-
nois courts have interpreted it. The Comment will then focus on the effect that
the legislature intended for ITSA to have on other bodies of law in Illinois.
Then this Comment will compare and contrast ITSA with the common law
from which it originated. The examination will show that ITSA has left some
doubt as to the correct interpretation of its effect on the common law contract
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. The Comment will discuss
possible interpretations of ITSA provisions and their effects on other laws, and
propose legislative action to clarify these intended effects. Finally, the Com-
ment will discuss the impact that ITSA and these interpretations will have on
the day-to-day business decisions of trade secret owners in Illinois.
I. BACKGROUND
Trade secret protection finds its origins in early English common law. 16 In
1891, although still adolescent in form, trade secret protection reached Illi-
nois.16 Illinois courts struggled to pinpoint an exact definition of a trade secret.
Given the broad gambit of data and items potentially covered by trade secret
doctrine, clear and precise definitions of trade secrets were the exception
rather than the rule.
Similarly, the bases for recovery for the misuse of a trade secret were not
always clear-cut.1 Sometimes recovery was sought based on a written contract
between the parties.1 8 In other instances the recovery was based in tort.19 This
Background Section will begin by focusing on the common law development of
trade secret doctrine in Illinois-the definition of a trade secret as well as the
bases of recovery for misuse. Next, this section will discuss how the develop-
ment of the law led to the eventual passage of ITSA. Lastly, the Background
15. See Newbery v. James, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1817); infra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text (discussing the facts of Newbery); I MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2.01, at 2-2
to 2-5 (1991) (tracing the development and form of trade secret doctrine from early English
common law to its present-day form in the United States); see also Lee M. Rosenbluth, Com-
ment, The Trade Secret Quagmire in Pennsylvania: A Mandate for Statutory Clarification, 86
DICK. L. REV. 137, 138 (1981) (stating that the English courts have recognized a legally protect-
able interest in trade secrets since the nineteenth century).
16. See Shonk Tin Printing Co. v. Shonk, 27 N.E.2d 529 (11. 1891).
17. Compare Service Ctrs. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132 (I1. App. Ct. 1989) (claim based on
a contract) with James C. Wilborn & Sons, Inc. v. Heniff, 237 N.E.2d 781 (Il1. App. Ct. 1968)
(claim sounding in tort). See also I JAGER supra note 15, § 3, at 3-1 (describing the development
of the law as based in several theories).
18. See infra notes 113-56 and accompanying text (discussing the contract cause of action).
19. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing the tort cause of action).
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will identify how the Act differs from the common law from which it
originated.
A. Early Common Law Trade Secret Protection
The first known dispute involving confidential information,"0 or trade
secrets, arose during the early 1800s in the English case of Newbery v.
James."' In this case, Lord Chancellor Eldon, acting for the court, refused to
issue an injunction prohibiting the disclosure of a secret formula for treating
gout, on the basis of trade secret misappropriation.2 2 Eventually, by the latter
half of the twentieth century, English trade secret protection had markedly
developed and culminated in the oft-cited case of Morison v. Moat. 23
Morison was the first instance in which a court issued an injunction on the
basis of trade secret misappropriation. In Morison, plaintiff Morison agreed to
form a partnership with defendant Moat for the purposes of selling "Morison's
Universal Medicine."' In a written agreement, Moat agreed that he was
"bound not to reveal the secret [formula of the medicine] to any person what-
soever." 25 Later, Moat disclosed the formula to his son.26 The court enjoined
Moat's son from using the secret formula in any way.2' The court reasoned
that Moat had not only broken a promise, but had also breached a duty of
faith that all employees owe to their employers. 28 The court thus impliedly
recognized that rights to trade secrets may in some instances exceed those
guaranteed by a patent. 9
20. For the purposes of this Comment, "confidential information" refers to data, formulae, in-
formation, or any other subject matter appropriate for trade secret protection. The list of items
possibly qualifying for trade secret protection is as diverse as it is lengthy. It should be noted,
however, that although not all confidential information qualifies for trade secret protection, all
trade secrets are necessarily confidential.
21. 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1817).
22. Id. at 1013. Lord Eldon reasoned that the formula for the medicine failed to meet the
.secrecy" requirement for trade secret status because most of the formula already had been dis-
closed to the public in a patent application. Id. at 1012. An additional reason cited for the refusal
to issue an injunction was-the impossibility of reviewing the secret formula without disclosure of
the secret. The court reasoned that if the secret was reviewed by the court, it would no longer be
"secret" and thereafter would not qualify for trade secret protection. Id. at 1013. Evidently the
concept of trade secret protection was so new that in camera proceedings were not yet available.
See I JAGER, supra note 15, § 2.01, at 2-3 to 2-4 (stating that trade secret protection had out-
developed the judicial procedures necessary to protect trade secrets).
23. 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851).
24. Id. at 493.
25. Id. at 493-94.
26. Id. at 495.
27. Id. at 503.
28. Id. at 499.
29. Id. at 500. Owners of confidential information may choose to protect their assets by patent
or trade secret. Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress "[lt]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. i, §
8, cl. 8. Congress has codified the patent protection in federal statutes. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376
[Vol. 41:885
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Many basic "tenets" 30 of trade secret law also find their origin in early En-
glish common law. For example, it became generally understood that an em-
ployer could enjoin a current or former employee from disclosing or otherwise
appropriating confidential information obtained at the employer's expense.3" It
was also well settled that an employee was always free to bring her general
knowledge and skills to a new employer. 32 The ex-employee, however, was not
free to use her employer's customer lists to her own advantage. 3
The idea of trade secret protection made the trans-Atlantic jump to the
United States in Vickery v. Welsh. 4 In Vickery, the first reported trade secret
(1988 & Supp. 1990). To qualify for patent protection, the invention or discovery must meet
several statutory requirements. The invention must have novelty, must have utility, and must be
"nonobvious." Id. §§ 101-103.
Patent owners are granted the right to exclude all others from using the patented invention for
a period of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154. In return, the patent is published and made availa-
ble to the public. Obtaining a patent, however, can be an expensive and time-consuming process.
Trade secrets, on the other hand, are protected by the common law, are not disclosed to the
public, and are protected for only so long as they remain secret. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
(1939). See generally Bruce A. Kugler, Note, Limiting Trade Secret Protection, 22 VAL. U. L.
REV. 725 (1988) (thoroughly discussing trade secrets and the employer-employee relationship).
30. Many concepts in trade secret law are referred to as tenets because they illustrate the
classic clash of the competing interests of trade secret law. Employers have a need to protect their
confidential information from their competitors. Without such protection, an employer's competi-
tors are allowed to reap the benefits of another's endeavors, and thus employers will have little or
no incentive to spend any resources on the development of commercially valuable information.
While competitors who steal confidential information are unjustly enriched, employees, on the
other hand, should not be unduly restricted in their freedom to pursue useful and fulfilling em-
ployment. Trade secret doctrine attempts to satisfy these two competing interests by prohibiting
employees from disclosing a former employer's trade secrets, while allowing an employee to take
to any subsequent employment her general knowledge and skills. See generally Hautman & Sulli-
van, supra note 1, at 253 (discussing the competing interests of employers and their employees).
31. See. e.g., Lamb v. Evans, 3 Ch. 462 (Eng. 1892) (holding that canvassers employed to
obtain advertisements for plaintiff's directory could not use their materials for a rival publication);
Merryweather v. Moore, 2 Ch. 518 (Eng. 1892) (holding that plaintiff's former employee could
not give tables and graphs, which he had compiled while employed by the plaintiff, to a rival
business).
32. See, e.g., Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Schott, Segner & Co., 3 Ch. 447, 453 (Eng.
1892) (noting that public policy mandates that an employee be free to bring her general knowl-
edge and skills to a new employer).
33. See, e.g., Robb v. Greene, 2 Q.B. 315 (Eng. 1895) (enjoining a former employee from
soliciting the customers of his former employer).
34. 36 Mass. (I Pick.) 523 (1837). In Vickery, a chocolate mill owner guaranteed by bond that
he would sell his chocolate mill along with his exclusive "secret manner of making chocolate."
When the owner later refused to abstain from telling others about the process, the court deter-
mined the bond forfeited and assessed damages against the seller. Id.
About thirty years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court again squarely faced the issue of
trade secret protection in Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868). The Peabody court became
the first American court to issue an injunction in a trade secret case. The court enjoined Norfolk,
who had signed a secrecy agreement, from using his former employer's design and process secrets
for the benefit of a subsequent employer. It recognized a "property right" in the secret and en-
joined its unauthorized use. The court noted that a trade secret did not have to be patentable and
the secrecy did not have to be absolute. Id.
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case in America,36 the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized a property
right in trade secrets.36
After Vickery, courts in the United States gradually adopted, developed,
and refined the early English common law by protecting trade secrets in a
state-by-state fashion.37 By 1891 the concept of trade secret protection had
reached the state of Illinois.38 Early Illinois decisions recognized a legitimate
interest in trade secrets.$9 But even as trade secret case law developed in Illi-
nois, it was not entirely clear what types of information would qualify as trade
secrets.40 Illinois had adopted an unpredictable, "I know it when I see it"
approach."'
35. I JAGER, supra note 15, § 2.02, at 2-6.
36. Vickery, 36 Mass. at 526-27. Because Vickery cited only English authority in support of
the decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in effect brought the English common law doc-
trine of trade secret protection to the United States. I JAGER, supra note 15, § 2.02, at 2-6.
37. While trade secrets are governed by state law, the three other forms of intellectual prop-
erty-patents, trademarks, and copyrights-are matters of federal law. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376
(1988 & Supp. 1990) (patent protection); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1114 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (trade-
mark protection); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (copyright protection). See gener-
ally Hautman & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 253 (discussing these areas of intellectual property).
For some time there was doubt as to whether there was room for state trade secret doctrine to
operate in the face of federal patent laws. The question was conclusively decided by the Supreme
Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473 (1974). In Kewanee, plaintiff com-
pany took sixteen years to develop an industrial crystal. Only nine months after leaving plaintiff's
employ, defendants produced an almost identical crystal. Applying Ohio trade secret law, the
district court granted an injunction. Id. Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that federal patent laws preempted state trade secret laws. id. at 472. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that state trade secret laws were not preempted by fed-
eral patent laws. Id. at 474; see also Richard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State
Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927 (1974) (calling for federal preemp-
tion of some applications of state trade secret law, but no preemption for others). But cf. Quick
Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1977) (federal patent laws not preempted by
state contract law where the parties contracted for the payment of a royalty in consideration for
the use of a patentable device).
38. Shonk Tin Printing Co. v. Shonk, 27 N.E. 529 (Il. 1891) (refusing to enjoin disclosure of
trade secrets absent a showing of harm).
39. See id. (implying that, had the plaintiff established the requisite harm, the defendant would
have been enjoined from using the plaintiff's trade secrets); see also Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff,
132 N.E.2d 806, 812 (111. 1921) ("[A] court of equity will restrain an employee from making
disclosures, or using trade secrets.").
40. See, e.g., MBL Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418, 423 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (recognizing
that an exact definition of a trade secret is not always possible); ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d
393, 398 (111. 1971) (noting that in many cases the question of whether a matter is a trade secret
is an extremely close one, often not predictable until a court has announced its ruling).
41. See, e.g., ILG, 273 N.E.2d at 395 ("Trade secrets may cover a wide spectrum of categories.
A definition of the possible objects of trade secrecy is understandably subject to variations and
change as the facts of any particular case might dictate."); see also Comment, Theft of Trade
Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 378-81 (1971) (commenting
that the 1971 "patchwork" of confused common law doctrines and definitions was inadequate to
protect investments in technological advances and to prevent industrial espionage).
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B. Common Law Trade Secret Protection in Illinois
The answer to the question of what does and does not constitute a trade
secret may be characterized as elusive at best.4" Illinois has long struggled to
pinpoint the precise boundaries of trade secret protection. Given the variety of
subject matter qualifying for trade secret protection this struggle has not been
an exact science.
1. Illinois Defines Trade Secrets
In Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff,"' the Illinois Supreme Court articulated
what became the controlling common law definition of a trade secret in Illi-
nois."" In Victor Chemical, a trade secret was considered "a plan or process,
tool, mechanism, compound or informational data utilized by a person in his
business operations and known only to him and such limited other persons to
whom it may become necessary to confide it.' 6  The determining factor of
whether something was a trade secret was the presence or absence of secrecy
surrounding the information. In Victor Chemical, the Victor Chemical Com-
pany alleged that its formula for the manufacturing process of phosphates,
more specifically its lime process for neutralizing free phosphoric acid, was a
trade secret.46 Victor Chemical sought to enjoin a former employee, Iliff, from
using the alleged trade secret after Iliff had set up a competing chemical
plant.47
Victor Chemical had taken great pains to guard the secrecy of its formula.' 8
There was evidence offered at trial, however, that the formula was an industry
standard. 49 Although Victor Chemical had protected the secrecy of its
formula, the court held that because the formula was not "sufficiently secret,"
it could not be protected as a trade secret. 0 The relative secrecy of an item
was determinative.
Regardless of the outcome, the Victor Chemical trade secret definition be-
came the standard common law definition of a trade secret in Illinois. "' The
42. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
43. 132 N.E. 806 (Il1. 1921).
44. Id. at 811.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 811-12.
47. Id. at 807-08.
48. Victor Chemical constructed high walls and fences around the plant and employed a night
watchman. The company also required its employees to sign a contract promising that they would
not disclose the manufacturing process to anyone. Id. at 812.
49. It was 'industry practice to use the same reacting agent, liquor catalyst, and oxidizer that
Victor Chemical used. Most other chemical companies even used the chemicals in similar propor-
tions. Id. at 546. Victor Chemical had to establish that its formula was not generally known.
Otherwise, the formula would not meet the relative secrecy required for trade secret protection.
50. Id.
51. See I JAGER, supra note 15, §2.02, at 2-16.3 n.51.la (citing Burt Dickens & Co. v. Bodi,
494 N.E.2d 817 (II1. App. Ct. 1986); Schuman v. IPCO Hosp. Supply Corp., 418 N.E.2d 161 (II.
App. Ct. 1981); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 245 N.E.2d 263 (I1. App. Ct. 1969); Revcor, Inc. v. Fame,
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same definition was advanced shortly thereafter in Schulenburg v. Signatrol,
Inc., 2 where, unlike in Victor Chemical, the court did find that a trade secret
existed.5 3 The trade secret in Schulenburg encompassed the assembly process
of devices called "flashers."" 4 Flashers are devices used in the sign industry to
make lights flash so that they animate the sign in a pattern or design. 5 Each
flasher was an assembly of gears, motors, metals, and other devices that could
be bought over the counter.56
In Schulenburg, the four individual defendants left the Schulenburg com-
pany to form Signatrol Corporation. 7 Signatrol was set up to manufacture
and market the same "flashers" that the defendants had assembled when they
were employees of Schulenburg.5 8 The court noted that, although the flashers
could be copied by legal means,59 they were not legally obtained when the
defendants obviously had directly copied Schulenburg's blueprints and techni-
cal drawings.60 These illegally copied drawings provided Signatrol with the
specific measurements, tolerances, and quality of materials used that could not
be obtained from the product itself without expensive and time-consuming
analysis.6 Consequently, the Schulenburg court held that the flashers were
trade secrets and enjoined Signatrol from assembling and selling them for the
period of time that it would have taken Signatrol to lawfully reverse-engineer6 2
the flashers. 3 Although secrecy was an important factor in ascertaining trade
secret status, the Schulenberg court also focused on the means used to obtain
the information.
The Restatement of Torts adopted the Victor Chemical definition of a trade
secret.64 The Restatement defines a trade secret as
Inc., 228 N.E.2d 742 (111. App. Ct. 1967); Aristocrat Window Co. v. Randall, 206 N.E.2d 545
(111. App. Ct. 1965); and Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865 (II1. 1965) as examples
of cases employing the Victor Chemical definition of a trade secret).
52. 212 N.E.2d 865 (II1. 1965), affd after remand, 226 N.E.2d 624 (I11. 967).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 865-66.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 866-67.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 868.
60. Id. at 868-69.
61. Id. at 869.
62. Reverse engineering is a process by which an end product is evaluated in order to determine
the means or methods used to produce that end product. Thus, a competitor may reverse engineer
to discover a rival competitor's trade secret. See, e.g., ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393 (III.
1971). The trade secrets involved in ILG were certain dimensions of a manufacturer's industrial
fans. The court noted that the trade secrets could be ascertained by obtaining the fans on the open
market, measuring the component parts, and reducing the measurements to a blue print type
drawing. This is an example of reverse engineering.
63. Schulenburg, 212 N.E.2d at 669-70.
64. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b at 5 (1939). The definition of a trade secret was not
included in the Second Restatement of Torts because the drafters concluded that the doctrine of
trade secret protection had not developed enough to warrant treatment as a separate body of law.
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any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a
chemical compound, a process for manufacturing, treating or preserving
materials, a pattern for a machine or other devices, or a list of customers. 65
The Restatement also lists six factors that should be evaluated in order to
determine whether or not an item is a trade secret. 66 The six factors are:
1. the extent to which information is known outside of a business;67
2. the extent to which it is known by employees and others in a business; 8
3. the extent of measures taken to preserve the secrecy of the information;69
4. the value of the information to a business and its competition; 70
5. the amount of effort or money expended in developing the information;7 1
and
6. the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly ac-
quired or duplicated by others.
7 2
This "codification" of the Victor Chemical definition provided courts with
additional areas of inquiry. Instead of the broader Victor Chemical definition
of a trade secret, the more specific mode of analysis provided by the Restate-
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS intro, note to div. 9 at 1-2 (1979) (concluding that the fields
of unfair competition and trade regulation were more appropriate arenas for the discussion of
trade secret law). See generally MILGRIM, supra note 11, § 2.01, at 2-17 n.2.1 (discussing the
decision to exclude trade secret law from the Second Restatement).
65. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Televation Telecommunication Sys. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (I11. App. Ct.
1988) (finding that schematics for an automatic wake-up system were trade secrets where the
schematics were unique, valuable, and could not easily be copied); Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced
Technology & MFG Corp., 498 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (citing the six-factor
Restatement definition of a trade secret) [author's note].
68. Televation, 522 N.E.2d at 1364-65 (finding that schematics for an automatic wake-up sys-
tem were trade secrets where the schematics were disclosed only to a few employees who had to
use them to do their jobs); Junkunc. 498 N.E.2d at 1183-84 (holding that segregation of employ-
ees and locking of files in the office inadequately guarded the secrecy of a manufacturing process)
[author's note].
69. See, e.g., Televation, 522 N.E.2d at 1365 (protecting information as trade secret where all
new employees were informed that the information was a trade secret and the information leaving
the office was stamped "proprietary"); Prentice Medical Corp. v. Todd, 495 N.E.2d 1044 (I1.
App. Ct. 1986) (recognizing plaintiffs patient list as a trade secret where it was kept under lock
and key) [author's note].
70. See, e.g., Televation, 522 N.E.2d at 1364-65 (enjoining the defendant corporation's use of
circuitry schematics where those schematics were developed by the plaintiff after the expense of
much time and effort); Junkunc, 498 N.E.2d at 1183 (citing the six-factor Restatement test)
[author's note].
71. See, e.g., Prentice Medical Corp., 495 N.E.2d at 1050 (holding that a customer list that
had been developed over a period of ten years was a protectable trade secret) [author's note].
72. See, e.g., Televation, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (holding that because designs and drawings of com-
ponent fan parts could not be lawfully reproduced without significant expense, the drawings were
protectable trade secrets) [author's note].
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ment's six-factor test could be uniformly employed. To accomplish this, two
specific areas of inquiry were added. The amount of money or effort expended
in developing the trade secret became one additional consideration.7 a The ease
of lawful replication of the trade secret became another.74
The Restatement definition was first employed in Illinois in the case of ILG
Industries v. Scott.7 In ILG, the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine whether drawings and blueprints containing information and specifica-
tions for parts to make industrial fans were trade secrets.76 Scott, the defend-
ant, took the drawings out of the office when his employment with ILG
Industries ("ILG") had been terminated.7 7 The drawings showed the configu-
rations of the retaining rings, blades of a particular wheel, and the proper
dimensions and materials for fans of different size ranges.78 Although some of
the dimensions used by ILG were standard throughout the industry, others
were not, and were unique to ILG.7 9
The ILG court employed a test akin to the six-factor Restatement analysis.
First, the court noted that the design of the wheels, the central part of the
fans, was developed over a period of eighteen months. 80 The court ruled that
this was a sufficient amount of time spent developing the trade secret. 8' Sec-
ond, although the information provided by the drawings could have been ob-
tained from the finished product, this procedure would have required the ex-
amination of a large number of fans of each size to accurately obtain the
dimensions in question. 2 This process of reverse engineering-if feasible at
all-would have been an expensive and time-consuming process. 83 Third, al-
though ILG had given parts of the drawings to suppliers who needed to use
them to manufacture component parts for ILG, the suppliers understood that
the drawings were confidential.84 In fact, it was one of ILG's suppliers who
had informed ILG that Scott was using one of its drawings.85 Fourth, the
court found that sufficient measures had been taken to protect the secrecy of
the drawings and the blueprints.8 The court based this finding on the facts
that not all of the critical information was supplied to the nonemployees who
had access to the drawings and that when the information was made available,
73. See Prentice Medical Corp., 495 N.E.2d at 1050.
74. See Televation, 522 N.E.2d 1359.
75. 273 N.E.2d 393 (I11. 1971) (protecting as trade secrets the designs and drawings of compo-
nent fan parts).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 394.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 397.
80. Id. at 394-95.
81. Id. at 397.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 396.
85. Id. at 396-97.
86. Id.
[Vol. 41:885
1992] PROTECTING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 895
it was with the recipient's knowledge that it was to be treated as confidential. 7
The court ruled that the drawings constituted trade secrets under the Re-
statement definition.88 It noted that: (1) some of ILG's designs were not
known throughout the industry and were unique to ILG; (2) the information
was not widely known to its employees; (3) by not disclosing all of the vital
parts of the drawings and by telling those who had copies that they were confi-
dential, enough measures were taken to guard the secrecy of the drawings; (4)
ILG's development of the drawings after eighteen months and at significant
expense was not inconsequential; and (5) the procedure that Scott would have
to go through to properly obtain the information supplied by the drawings
would have been quite difficult considering the time and expense involved.89
Thus, the court held that the plaintiff's plans sufficiently met the criteria nec-
essary to be trade secrets under the Restatement definition.
The Restatement approach was unsuccessfully advanced by a plaintiff in
MBL Corp. v. Diekman.90 In this case MBL Corporation ("MBL") sued its
former employee, Diekman, to enjoin him from using its alleged trade secret, 91
a centrifugal molding process for belt-producing equipment.92 Although the
process that MBL used was not discussed in any industry literature, another
industry competitor used a substantially similar process.9"
Diekman, who had assisted in the ongoing development of the process,
sought to use an almost identical process when he started his own business. 94
When MBL attempted to restrain Diekman from using its "secret process,"
the court held that the process was not a trade secret because it was not se-
cret-it was generally known in the industry.95 The first factor of the Restate-
ment test, the extent to which information is known outside of a business, was
fatal to the plaintiffs claim that the process was a trade secret. 96
87. Id.
88. Id. at 397.
89. Id. Although the court did not specifically address the fourth Restatement factor-the
value of the information to a business and its competition-it may be inferred from the amount of
time and money spent on developing the drawings that they were indeed considered valuable as-
sets to the plaintiff.
90. 445 N.E.2d 418 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 420-21.
93. Id. at 423. It was common in the industry: (I) not to use a vacuum in the process; (2) to
use the specific ingredients that MBL used; and (3) to use a range of proportions of ingredients
and conditions similar to MBL's in the process of manufacturing the belts. Id. at 424.
94. Id. at 422.
95. Id. at 424.
96. Id.
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2. Common Law Bases of Recovery for the Misuse of a Trade Secret in
Illinois
At common law in Illinois there are two main theories upon which one may
base recovery for the misuse of a trade secret.9 7 Since the inception of trade
secret doctrine, Illinois courts have allowed actions for relief grounded in tort"
and based upon breach of contract."
a. The tort theory
The first and most common method for seeking redress for the misappropri-
ation of trade secrets rests upon the tort theory of injury caused by the disclos-
ure of a trade secret in breach of a confidential relationship. 100 This approach
focuses on the personal relationship of the parties at the time of disclosure
rather than the property-type right in the trade secret itself.'' The Restate-
ment adopts this approach where it provides that "one who discloses or uses
another's trade secret is liable to the other if his disclosure or use constitutes a
breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to
97. ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADE
SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS § 1.01(b), at 1-2 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the most
common theories upon which recovery for trade secret misappropriation is based). Trade secret
owners have based causes of action for misappropriation of trade secrets on principles of unjust
enrichment, agency, trust, and restitution. Id.
For an interesting discussion of trade secrets viewed as property rights, see I JAGER, supra note
15, § 4.01[3], at 4-12.1 to 4-20. The United States Supreme Court implicitly adopted this view in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984), where it held that trade secrets are property
rights within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
However, the property approach does not seem to be advanced often in Illinois. See, e.g., North-
ern Petrochem. Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying Illinois law and noting
that "a suit to redress the theft of a trade secret is one grounded in tort").
98. See Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (interpreting Illinois tort law). The Tomlinson court held
that an action for theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort-the theft being "the misfeasance
against which the law protects." Id. at 1060. Although the court found that a trade secret did
exist, and that it had been improperly acquired by a former employee who had been in a position
of trust when the process was disclosed to him, the court did not enjoin the employee from using
the trade secret because he had not used it for a period of time longer than it would have taken
him to develop the process lawfully. Id. at 1059-60.
99. See, e.g., Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806 (i1. 1921) (stating that a court of
equity will restrain the disclosure or use of trade secrets, particularly if one has contracted not to
do so).
100. See, e.g., Tomlinson, 484 F.2d at 1060 ("[A] suit to redress the theft of a trade secret is
one grounded in tort."); ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393 (111. 1971) (using the Restatement
of Torts as a guide to the basis of recovery); James C. Wilborn & Sons, Inc. v. Heniff, 237
N.E.2d 781 (II1. App. Ct. 1968) (noting that a combination of persons can injure the business of
another by inducing a person to violate a duty not to use or divulge trade secrets); see also I
JAGER, supra note 15, § 4.01[2], at 4-8 (noting that the tort theory of injury caused by the
disclosure or use of a trade secret is the most popular conceptual approach to trade secret law).
101. 1 JAGER, supra note 15, § 4.01[2], at 4-8 (describing the tort theory as deemphasizing the
nature of the property sought to be protected and emphasizing the personal relationship of the
parties). See generally Klitzke, supra note 4, at 279-80 (discussing the eventual codification of the
tortious appropriation of a trade secret).
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him ."12
In order to recover for the misuse of a trade secret in tort, a plaintiff must
establish two elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret; and (2) the defend-
ant's wrongful disclosure or appropriation of the secret for the defendant's own
benefit.103
Most of the early trade secret cases were tort actions focusing on the breach
of confidence involved in the disclosure of another's trade secret."0 4 The tort
approach has continued vitality even today in Illinois. For example, in
Heatbath Corp. v. Ifkovits, °0 an employer alleged that its customer list was a
trade secret and sought to enjoin a former employee, who had opened a com-
peting business, from using the list to solicit customers.10 The court, focusing
on an employee's fiduciary duty to his employer, held that the former em-
ployee, whose newly formed business was similar to that of his former em-
ployer, was properly enjoined from soliciting the prior employer's customers
for business.10 7 The tort cause of action was again asserted in Armour & Co.
v. United American Food Processors, Inc.'0 8 There the court held that equity
will restrain an employee from making disclosures or using trade secrets "com-
municated to him in the course of a confidential employment."' 0 9
The typical employer/employee relationship, however, is not the only con-
text in which Illinois will recognize a confidential relationship that gives rise to
102. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 737 (1939). Although the Restatement greatly contributed to
the development of trade secret law, it is limited in two very important respects. First, by its very
nature the Restatement is simply a summary of generally recognized principles of law and is not
binding on state courts. Courts are free to adopt variations on the Restatement theme or even to
depart significantly from it. Second, the Restatement discussion is incomplete. For example, it
discusses damages in a very limited sense and does not discuss application of the statute of limita-
tions at all. Klitzke, supra note 4, at 282-83 (discussing the infirmities of the Restatement
definition).
103. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Trade secrets were not included in the Second
Restatement of Torts because they have developed into a separate body of law. See United
Centrifugal Pumps v. Cusimano, 708 F. Supp. 1038 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (noting that trade secrets
are now treated in the Restatement of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1-2 (1979).
104. See, e.g.. Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806, 812 (Il1. 1921) (stating that a court
of equity will restrain an employee from making disclosures or using trade secrets "communicated
to him in the course of a confidential employment"); Witkowsky v. Affeld, 119 N.E. 630 (Il1.
1918) (holding that persons who, in their capacity as agents, obtain the custody of books and
documents of their principal or come into possession of secrets relating to their principal's affairs
may be restrained from making them public or from using them for their own advantage).
105. 254 N.E.2d 139 (Il1. App. Ct. 1969).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 144 (refusing to enjoin former employee from using the customer list, but enjoining
the employee from soliciting those customers for products made utilizing his former employee's
secret formulae).
108. 345 N.E.2d 795 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
109. Id. at 800. The United States Supreme Court took a similar approach in E.I. du Pont
Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). In an opinion authored by Justice Holmes, the
Supreme Court enjoined the disclosure of trade secrets by a former du Pont employee. The Court
stated that "the property may be denied, but the confidence may not be." Id. at 102.
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a duty not to disclose trade secrets. In Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc.," 0 a plaintiff
manufacturer necessarily disclosed its prints and drawings, both trade secrets,
to defendant tool and die makers hired by the manufacturer to produce certain
tools."' The court imputed a confidential relationship between the two compa-
nies and enjoined the tool makers from disclosing the trade secrets of the
manufacturer.'
b. The contract theory
Contract is a second theory upon which trade secret actions may be
based." ' In fact, any two parties may contract not to reveal certain informa-
tion-trade secrets or any other types of confidential information. This Com-
ment, however, will deal in detail with the contractual protection of trade
secrets specifically. One advantage to using a contract as a means of protect-
ing trade secrets is that by signing the agreement, the promisor is put on no-
tice that the promisee regards the identified types of information as trade
secrets.
Owners of trade secrets may disclose their business secrets to those in whom
it becomes necessary to confide, and then contractually bind their confidante
not to disclose them." 4 For almost as long as trade secrets have been recogniz-
able rights in Illinois, courts have paid special attention to their protection
where the parties have contractually agreed to limit their use."' As early as
1921, in Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that it would restrain the disclosure or use of trade secrets communicated to a
person in the course of a confidential relationship, "particularly where that
person has contracted not to do so."''
Although courts have expended much effort to delineate clearly the bounda-
ries of trade secret protection, it is not entirely clear how willing the courts are
to enforce the contractual protection of trade secrets. For example, states are
110. 228 N.E.2d 742 (11). App. Ct. 1967).
I1l. Id. at 744.
112. Id. at 746.
113. See SEIDEL, supra note 97, § 1.01(b), at I (discussing the origins of trade secret
protection).
114. This contractual protection may take the form of confidentiality agreements or covenants
not to disclose. See, e.g., Service Ctrs. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (confi-
dentiality agreement); Illinois Tool Works v. Kovac, 357 N.E.2d 639 (11. App. Ct. 1976) (cove-
nant not to disclose).
115. See, e.g., Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806, 812 (I1. 1921) (defendant had con-
tractually agreed not to disclose the plaintiffs trade secret). For a discussion of Victor Chemical,
see supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
116. Victor Chem., 132 N.E.2d at 812 (emphasis added); see also Armour & Co. v. United
Am., 345 N.E.2d 795, 800 (I1. App. Ct. 1976) (noting that equity will restrain an employee by
injunctive relief from making disclosures or using a trade secret communicated to him in the
course of a confidential relationship, particularly where the parties have contracted for the se-
crecy). Contra Stocker Hinge Mfg. Co. v. Darnell Indus., 377 N.E.2d 1125 (I1. App. Ct. 1978)
(finding that a provision in an employment agreement for the preservation of trade secrets was
unenforceable).
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split as to whether a contractual provision prohibiting the disclosure of trade
secrets must have reasonable time and/or geographical limitations before that
provision will be considered an enforceable part of a contract. Some states
require that there be some boundaries on the contractual duty not to dis-
close. 17 Other states, however, have explicitly rejected the notion that contrac-
tual protection of trade secrets must be so limited to be enforceable. '" Illinois,
however, for quite some time had never squarely faced this issue.
The cases of Disher v. Fulgoni,"9 and Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed,120
became the platforms from which Illinois courts evaluated whether a contrac-
tual provision prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets was enforceable in
Illinois. The courts in these two decisions required time and territorial restric-
tions on a contractual duty not to disclose trade secrets in order for the con-
tract to be enforceable." 1
In Disher, the defendant, Information Resources, Inc. ("IRI"), was a mar-
ket research firm that offered computer-based services and systems for market
research and analysis.' 22 In August 1981, IRI hired Disher.1 21 When Disher
started as vice-president of operations, his job duties consisted mainly of di-
recting market operations, including data input and in-market quality
control. 2 "
Some time after he joined IRI, Disher was asked to sign a confidentiality
agreement. 2  The agreement provided that Disher would not disclose IRI's
trade secrets and confidential information to any third party.'26 Without time
or geographical limitations on the duty not to disclose, the agreement prohib-
ited Disher from disclosing trade secrets to anyone, at any time. 12  Although
Disher initially objected to signing the agreement on the grounds that the
agreement was too vague, he eventually signed the agreement in January of
117. See, e.g., Electrical South, Inc. v. Lewis, 385 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (directing
that only those confidentiality agreements containing reasonable time and geographical limits will
be enforceable); AMP, Inc. v. Richard, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 260, 266-67 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1982)
(imposing time and territorial restraints on an agreement to protect trade secrets).
118. See, e.g., Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 586 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that the
owner of a trade secret has an absolute, temporally unlimited right to a trade secret under Mis-
souri law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 344 P.2d 821 (Ca. 1971) (refusing to
apply a California statute requiring reasonable time and geographical limitations on restrictive
covenants to a contract preventing the disclosure of trade secrets).
119. 464 N.E.2d 639 (I11. App. Ct. 1984).
120. 482 N.E.2d 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
121. Id.; Disher, 464 N.E.2d 639.
122. Disher, 464 N.E.2d at 640.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at, 641.
126. Id. The alleged trade secrets at issue included, but were not limited to, client lists, market-
ing and business plans, computer programs, test designs, financial and business data, and other
proprietary information. Id.
127. Id. The agreement prohibited Disher from disclosing the information "to any third party."
It also specifically provided that: "This agreement of confidentiality will survive my [Disher's]
employment at IRI." Id.
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1982 in fear of losing his job."2 8 Less than a year and a half after he signed
the agreement, Disher was fired. 12 9 Disher sued his employer, IRI, for, among
other things, invalidation of the employee confidentiality agreement that he
had signed.130 Disher sought a preliminary injunction nullifying or restraining
enforcement of the confidentiality agreement.131 When the circuit court denied
his motion, Disher appealed.1 2
The Disher court equated Disher's confidentiality agreement with a cove-
nant not to compete because those two types of agreements are almost identi-
cal in purpose and effect.1 33 The court noted that the same public policies that
necessitated time and territorial restrictions on covenants not to compete 34
required time and territorial restrictions on confidentiality agreements. 35 The
Disher court concluded that Illinois policy renders unenforceable any contrac-
tual duty not to disclose trade secrets that causes undue hardship to a con-
tracting party.' 36 Furthermore, according to the court, Illinois policy requires
that the restrictions be no greater than necessary to protect the proprietary
interests of the owner of a trade secret.13' The court then noted that the re-
striction before it contained no time or territorial restrictions on Disher's duty
not to disclose. 138 It held that without any time or geographical restrictions, a
confidentiality agreement is, on its face, overly broad in scope and duration
and consequently unenforceable. 39
The court ruled that the unlimited scope and duration of the confidentiality
agreement strongly suggested that the agreement was in contravention of Illi-
nois public policy. 140 Therefore, because Disher had demonstrated a reasona-
ble likelihood of success on the merits, the lower court should have granted
128. Id.
129. id.
130. Id. at 642.
131. Id. at 640.
132. Id. at 642.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 642-44. The court believed that enforcing the confidentiality agreement without
time and territorial restrictions would negatively impact the policies of: (1) encouraging fair com-
petition in the business sector; (2) not unnecessarily restricting an individual's freedom to pursue a
particular occupation; (3) not unjustly requiring an individual who has worked in a particular field
to erase from his mind all of the general skills, knowledge, acquaintances, and overall expertise
acquired during a tenure with a former employer; and (4) facilitating the free flow of information
necessary for competition among businesses. Id.; see supra note 30 (discussing these policies as the
basic tenets of trade secret law).




139. Id. The court declared that to be enforceable, confidentiality agreements must have rea-
sonable time and geographic limits. Furthermore, the information must truly be confidential and
the restrictions must be reasonably necessary for the protection of a legitimate proprietary inter-
est. Id.
140. Id. at 644.
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Disher's motion to restrain enforcement of the agreement."'
Disher thus seemingly created a bright-line rule. Without time or geograph-
ical restrictions on a contractual obligation not to disclose trade secrets, the
contract can be invalidated. Disher, decided by the influential Illinois Appel-
late Court for the First District, was followed by the second district in Cincin-
nati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed.14
In Cincinnati Tool, the plaintiff, Cincinnati Tool Steel Co., a manufacturer
of tool and die steels, hired Patricia Breed as a typist in 1978.142 She later held
the positions of receptionist, sales secretary, sales coordinator, purchasing
agent, inside sales person, and lastly, sales manager."' Prior to 1983, Breed
had no written employment contract.'45 In 1983 she signed a six-month em-
ployment contract in which she agreed not to disclose "during or after the
time of her employment . . . to any party" any confidential information be-
longing to Cincinnati Tool."4 6
In June 1984, Breed resigned her position with Cincinnati Tool and ac-
cepted a job with one of its competitors. 47 Cincinnati Tool then sought to
enjoin Breed from disclosing alleged company trade secrets.' 48 When the cir-
cuit court denied Cincinnati Tool's application for an injunction, Cincinnati
Tool appealed. Although in its final analysis the appellate court affirmed the
circuit court's holding that the proprietary items were not trade secrets,' 9 it
still ruled on the validity of the confidentiality agreement.' 50 The court, follow-
ing Disher, held that the agreement was unenforceable on its face.' The
agreement contained no time' 5" or geographical limitations, 15 3 and thus did
not establish a valid contractual right to prohibit the disclosure of trade
141. Id.
142. Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170 (Il1. App. Ct. 1985).
143. Id. at 172.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 174.
147. Id. at 172.
148. Id. Cincinnati Tool based its case on three separate theories. Count I sought to enjoin
Breed based on common law fiduciary duty principles. Although Count 11 sought the same relief,
it was based on the employment contract. Count III sought to enjoin Breed from violating a
covenant not to compete, in which Breed agreed not to solicit or contact any of Cincinnati Tool's
customers for a period of six months after leaving. Id.
149. Id. at 176-79. The informational items were not treated as confidential and secret inside
Cincinnati Tool, the information was easy to duplicate independently, and Cincinnati Tool's rela-
tionship with its clients could not be characterized as near-permanent. Id. Although some docu-
ments were marked "Confidential," it was apparent from Breed's testimony that the information
was never locked up and that everyone had access to it, including outside personnel. Furthermore,
every phone number was listed in a telephone directory. Id.
150. id. at 180.
151. Id. at 175, 180.
152. Id. at 175. Breed was prohibited from disclosing information during or after her time of
employment. Id.
153. Id. The agreement simply prohibited disclosure to any third party. Id.
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secrets.'5 4
After Disher, Cincinnati Tool, and the cases that followed them,15 it be-
came well-settled law in Illinois that agreements to contractually protect trade
secrets and other confidential information would not be enforceable unless
they contained reasonable time and geographical limits on the duty not to
disclose.'56
3. A Trade Secret Owner's Remedy for Misappropriation
Traditionally a trade secret owner has had a variety of remedies at her dis-
posal. As summarized in the Restatement, a trade secret owner "may recover
damages for past harm, or be granted an injunction against future harm by
disclosure or adverse use, or be granted an accounting of the wrongdoer's prof-
its. . . .Moreover, he may have two or more of these remedies in the same
action . . . . ,1"17 Although other states have allowed the owner of a trade se-
cret to recover money damages, an injunction remained the primary common
law remedy in Illinois for the misappropriation of trade secrets. 5 8
From early English common law to present day, more often than not trade
secret owners have requested an injunction as their remedy of choice for trade
secret misappropriators.' 51 Illinois issued its first injunction in a trade secret
context in Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc."10 In Schulenburg, the plaintiff's for-
mer employees were ordered to abstain from using the plaintiff's designs and
drawings to manufacture certain items.' Since then, injunctions prohibiting
154. Id.
155. See. e.g., AMP, Inc. v. Fleishhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1987); Nitron Int'l Sales
Co. v. Carroll, 714 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Samuel Bingham Co. v. Maron, 651 F. Supp.
102 (N.D. II1. 1986).
156. See North Am. Paper Co. v. Unterberger, 526 N.E.2d 621 (111. App. Ct. 1988). In North
American Paper, the agreement before the court provided that "[tihe employee agrees that he
... will [not] . . .at any time, during and after the date of his employment with the Company,
disclose ... any information regarding manufacturing, purchasing, research, development .... "
Id. at 623. Citing Cincinnati Tool, 482 N.E.2d 170 (111. App. Ct. 1985), the court stated that the
confidentiality agreement was enforceable only if it had reasonable time and geographical limita-
tions. North Am. Paper, 526 N.E.2d at 623. The agreement before the court, with neither time
nor geographical limitations, was an impermissible restraint of trade and void as a matter of law.
Id. at 414-16. See also Perman v. ArcVentures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (noting
that an agreement providing that "the employee will not, during or after the term of his employ-
ment, disclose the list of this employer's] customers ... to any person" was unreasonable and
unenforceable given its unlimited geographical and time dimensions); Service Ctrs. v. Minogue,
535 N.E.2d 1132 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (holding confidentiality agreement unrestricted in duration
or scope unreasonable and unenforceable, although the materials sought to be protected were not
trade secrets).
157. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. e (1939).
158. See generally I JAGER, supra note 15, § 7.02, at 7-4 to 7-54 (recognizing the need for
prompt and effective injunctive relief).
159. MILGRIM, supra note 11, § 7.08[3][a] (noting that an injunction is the most common
remedy for trade secret misappropriation).
160. 212 N.E.2d 865 (111. 965), aff'd after remand, 226 N.E.2d 624 (I11. 967).
161. Id. For a discussion of Schulenburg, see supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
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the disclosure of trade secrets have been issued at the request of many injured
trade secret owners.
162
Because the proper length of an injunction often is the subject of contro-
versy, Illinois has a well-developed body of law concerning the proper duration
of an injunction. 163 A successful plaintiff in a trade secret case is entitled to
enjoin the defendant for only so long as it would take that defendant to law-
fully develop or discover the secret.'
For example, in Schulenburg, the court determined that the plaintiff's de-
sign drawings for fan parts were trade secrets.' 65 After factually determining
that the drawings in question could be lawfully produced over a period of eigh-
teen months, the court enjoined the defendants from using the drawings in
question for an eighteen-month period.' 66
By 1985 the status of trade secret law in Illinois had markedly developed, in
at least three important ways, since its introduction into the state in 1891.16
First, Illinois courts had settled on the Restatement analysis to define a trade
secret.'66 Although at times it was uncertain what the precise boundaries of
trade secret protection were, using this analysis courts had protected draw-
ings,' 69 processes,' customer lists,' and circuitry schematics 72 as trade
secrets. Second, it was relatively well established that actions for trade secret
misuse could be grounded in tort1 73 as well as in contract.' 7' Third, those who
could establish that their trade secrets had been appropriated unlawfully were
not without legal recourse. Illinois courts would issue a successful plaintiff an
162. See supra note 14 (listing cases in which courts have issued injunctions).
163. MILGRIM, supra note 11, § 7.0811] n.12.1 (discussing the development of Illinois law con-
cerning the proper scope of an injunction).
164. ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393 (III. 1971) (holding that the proper length of an
injunction would be the eighteen-month period of time that it would have taken the defendants to
lawfully discover the trade secret); Schulenburg, 212 N.E.2d 865.
165. Schulenberg, 212 N.E.2d 865.
166. Id.
167. Compare Shonk Tin Printing Co. v. Shonk, 27 N.E. 529 (II1. 1891) (introducing trade
secret law in Illinois) with Televation Telecommunication Sys., Inc. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359
(1988) (applying trade secret case law after almost 100 years of development). See also supra
notes 64, 103 (discussing the codification of trade secret law in a separate Restatement).
168. See supra notes 64-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement definition of a
trade secret and how it has been applied in Illinois).
169. ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393 (I11. 1971) (drawings providing specifications for
industrial fans).
170. Schulenburg, 212 N.E.2d 865 (assembly process for electric flashers used in business
signs).
171. Armour & Co. v. United Am. Food Process, Inc., 345 N.E.2d 795 (I11. App. Ct. 1976)
(customer list used in mail order sale and distribution of meat products).
172. Televation Telecommunication Sys., Inc. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (III. App. Ct.
1988) (schematic of electronic circuitry for wake-up recording device).
173. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing the common law tort cause of
action).
174. See supra notes 113-56 and accompanying text (discussing the common law contract
cause of action).
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injunction prohibiting a third party from unlawfully using her trade secret. 175
Such was the state of the law in Illinois when its state legislature sought to
codify the law in what was to become the Illinois Trade Secrets Act.
17 6
II. THE ILLINOIS TRADE SECRETS ACT
Although Illinois courts addressed issues of trade secrets and their protec-
tion, the guidance that these cases provided to business persons desirous of
protecting their ideas, processes, blueprints, or customer lists was often nebu-
lous if not outright conflicting. ' 77 Businesses were thus left unsure whether
their trade secrets were protectable and, if they were, what the boundaries of
this protection would be.' 78
This judicial climate of trade secret protection led Illinois to adopt the Illi-
nois Trade Secrets Act ("ITSA" or "Act")'. 79 The Act, effective January 1,
1988, "10 was based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA").' 8' UTSA
evolved in an attempt to create a uniform state trade secret law and to clearly
define the often fuzzy parameters of trade secret protection and remedies for
misappropriation.' 82 UTSA, approved by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1979,183 represents the culmination of over
seven years of work by the American Bar Association's Special Committee on
the Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act.8 4 To date, thirty-five states and
the District of Columbia have adopted UTSA or a version of it.'85
175. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (discussing the common law injunctive
relief available for trade secret misappropriation).
176. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 351-359 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
177. MBL (USA) v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418 (111. App. Ct. 1983). See generally Comment,
supra note 41, at 378-81 (advocating the codification of state trade secret laws to more clearly
delineate the boundaries of trade secret protection).
178. Comment, supra note 41, at 378-81.
179. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 351-359. ITSA, sponsored by Rep. John Dunn, was originally
submitted to the House Judiciary I Committee in tlhe form unanimously approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Section Council. Two amendments
were adopted and incorporated into the proposal that became law in 1987.
180. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, 359. The legislative history concerning ITSA is relatively
sparse.
181. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 14 U.L.A. 433 (Supp. 1990). For a
comprehensive discussion of UTSA see Klitzke, supra note 4.
182. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS. 14 U.L.A. 433 commissioner's pref-
atory note.
183. Id.
184. Id. The committee was appointed in 1968 and presented UTSA for its first reading in
1972. After a few years of inactivity, the committee met in 1976, when, given the length of time
that had elapsed, it presented the Fifth Tentative Draft of the Act as a first reading. On August 9,
1979, the Act was approved and recommended for enactment in all the jurisdictions. In 1985, four
clarifying amendments were approved and also recommended for enactment in all the jurisdic-
tions. Id.
185. Id. The jurisdictions that have adopted a version of UTSA are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis-
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The bill that became ITSA was first submitted to the Illinois House of Rep-
resentatives on March 10, 1987, when it was referred to the House Judiciary I
Committee.' 86 In the House, two amendments to the bill were proposed and
adopted. 87 One expressly defined reverse engineering and independent devel-
opment and provided that they are proper means of obtaining trade secret
information."' The second amendment placed emphasis on relative secrecy as
the definitional test for a trade secret. 89
The bill was approved by the House in its final form and sent to the Illinois
Senate where it was referred to, and subsequently recommended for approval
by, the Senate Judiciary Committee. 90 The bill was presented for its third and
final reading and passed by both Houses on June 22, 1987.1'' On September
11, 1987, the Governor signed the bill into law, and in Public Act 85-366,
Illinois adopted its version of UTSA to become effective January 1, 1988.192
The purposes of ITSA were to codify and establish Illinois trade secret law
and to clarify the scope of trade secret protection in Illinois. 93 ITSA can be
broken down into three main sections-definitions, 94 remedies, 9 ' and effects
on existing laws.' 96
A. The Definitions
The heart of ITSA is contained in its definitions. 97 The definitions codify
the preexisting common law tort cause of action against the misuse of a trade
secret.' 98 The ITSA definitional section defines who may be liable for trade
secret misappropriation. 9 9 Actions may be brought against natural persons,
corporations, governmental entities, and even not-for-profit entities. 200
Section 2(a) describes the "improper means" through which trade secret
sissippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 140 table of jurisdictions (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
186. HB-0542, 85th Gen Ass., 1987 Sess., reprinted in 2 ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE






192. Illinois Trade Secrets Act, P.A. No. 85-366 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 1 351-
359 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991)).
193. See Marvin N. Benn, ISBA Trade Secret Act Passed, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 14, 1988,
at I (describing the purposes and the provisions of ITSA).
194. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 11 351-352.
195. Id. 353-356.
196. Id. 358.
197. Id. 1 352.
198. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing the common law tort cause of
action).
199. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, T 352(c).
200. Id.
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misappropriation may occur.20 1 ITSA includes breach of a confidential rela-
tionship, theft, bribery, breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, and electronic
surveillance as possible improper means."'2 These are codified examples of the
improper means by which one may acquire another's trade secret-the show-
ing of which is one of the elements necessary for common law tort recovery.10s
Section 2(b) describes acts that may constitute misappropriation of a trade
secret.20 4 Misappropriation is defined as acquisition of a trade secret by im-
proper means.20 5 According to section 2(b)(2), misappropriation also takes
place in certain circumstances when one discloses a trade secret without
permission.206
ITSA also defines what constitutes a "trade secret. 2 0 7 First, it lists techni-
cal or nontechnical data, formulas, patterns, compilations, programs, devices,
methods, techniques, drawings, processes, financial data, or lists of actual or
potential customers or suppliers as appropriate subject matter for trade secret
protection. 208 This list of possible subject matter is only illustrative rather than
201. Id. 352(a).
202. Id. Reverse engineering or independent development are not considered improper means.
id.
203. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 102 (listing the elements of the tort cause of
action).
204. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 352(b). ITSA provides:
Misappropriation means:
(1) acquisition of a trade secret of a person by another person who knows or
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(2) disclosure or use of a trade secret of a. person without express or implied
consent by another person who:
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
the knowledge of the trade secret was:
(I) derived from or through a person who utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(11) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(111) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its ecrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change in position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired





208. Id. ITSA departs from UTSA in that it specifically states that customer lists are appropri-
ate subject matter for trade secrets. Customer lists, however, generally have been characterized as
lying in the "periphery" of trade secret law. See Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v.
Hosch, 325 N.W.2d 883, 886 (Wis. 1982) (noting that because most lists are developed in the
ordinary course of business, they lack the secrecy requirement necessary to qualify for trade secret
protection); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 955 (1964)
(describing customer lists as in the periphery of trade secret law). Illinois appears to have codified
the overwhelming majority of its decisions that specifically identify customer lists as trade secrets.
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exclusive.209 Material not specifically mentioned may still qualify for trade se-
cret protection if it meets the two statutory requirements." 0 Second, ITSA
codifies the two basic requirements for protection under Illinois law. The two
statutory requirements are that the information be relatively secret, 1 ' and
that adequate measures be taken by an owner of the trade secret to protect
this secrecy.212
B. Remedies
ITSA provides a court with broad discretion in shaping an injunction to
provide the necessary equitable relief for the protection of a trade secret.2 13
First, it provides that a court may enjoin actual or threatened misappropria-
tion.214 ITSA permits this injunction to be dissolved at the request of a party
when the trade secret has ceased to exist 21 5 although in some circumstances16
an injunction may still be continued for a reasonable time. 217
See, e.g., Witkowsky v. Affeld, 119 N.E. 630 (III. 1918) (granting trade secret protection to a
customer list); Prentice Medical Corp. v. Todd, 495 N.E.2d 1044 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding
that a medical center's list of patients was a protectable trade secret). Contra Burt Dickens & Co.
v. Bodi, 494 N.E.2d 817 (III. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that a customer list was not a protectable
trade secret); American Claims Serv., Ltd. v. Boris, 485 N.E.2d 534 (III. App. Ct. 1985) (holding
that an insurance company's list of clients was not a trade secret where the names of the clients
were readily obtainable in a widely published directory); Lincoln Towers Ins. Agency v. Farrell,
425 N.E.2d 1034 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (finding no protectable business interest in insurance
agency's customer list); Smith Oil Corp. v. Viking Chem. Co., 468 N.E.2d 797 (I11. App. Ct.
1984) (suggesting that confidential customer information may be protected only by contract).
209. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 352(d).
210. Id. T 352(d)(l)-(2).
211. Id. T 352(d)(1).
212. Id. 352(d). ITSA requires that the information (I) be "sufficiently secret to derive eco-
nomic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to [or readily ascertainable by]
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) [be] the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy or confidentiality." Id.
The UTSA phrase "and not being readily ascertainable by proper means" was deleted from ITSA
to follow in line with earlier decisions in Illinois, holding that the mere availability of proper
means by which one may acquire knowledge of a trade secret is no defense to an action for
misappropriation, if in fact, improper means were used. See, e.g., Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc.,
212 N.E.2d 865 (Ill. 1965) (enjoining a misappropriator's use of trade secrets where, although the
trade secret could be lawfully developed, in the present instance, it was not), affid after remand,
226 N.E.2d 624 (II1. 1967). For a similar result in other jurisdictions, see Telex Corp. v. IBM,
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (assessing damages against a corporation that unlawfully appropri-
ated another's trade secret); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953) (awarding the
trade secret owner an injunction although the trade secret was obtainable through proper means).
213. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 11 353-356.
214. Id. 1 353.
215. Id.
216. Id. These reasons may include, but are not limited to, an elimination of the commercial
advantage that was derived from misappropriation, deterrence of wilful or malicious misappropri-
ation, or elimination of an advantage obtained where the trade secret ceases to exist due to the




Second, a court may condition future use of the trade secret upon payment
of a royalty to the trade secret owner. 1 8 A court may do this when there is a
great public interest in not enjoining the use of the trade secret.21 9 Although
not decided under ITSA, Republic Aviation Corp. v. Schenk22 1 is illustrative
of such a situation. The issue in Schenk was whether a misappropriator would
be enjoined from supplying the United States with an aircraft weapons control
system.221 Without the system, military operations might have been compro-
mised. 222 The court held that, although the item at issue was a trade secret
that had been misappropriated, in lieu of issuing an injunction it would condi-
tion sale of the trade secret upon payment of a reasonable royalty to the owner
of the trade secret.222 When a court exercises this option, ITSA provides that
the royalty payments may not continue for any length of time greater than the
individual is capable of being enjoined.224
Third, a court may, at its discretion, mandate that certain steps be taken in
order to ensure the protection of a trade secret .22  This includes protective
orders, in camera review, and "for attorney eyes only" orders.22 1
In addition to injunctive relief, ITSA allows a successful claimant to receive
damages 227 as well as attorney's fees in special cases.228 The owner of a trade
secret is entitled to recover damages, in addition to injunctive relief, for the
misappropriation of a trade secret. 229 A court may award damages for the
actual loss to the owner of a trade secret and the unjust enrichment caused by
the misappropriation, as long as there is no duplication of damages. 30 If dam-
ages cannot be established, the court may award the owner a reasonable
royalty. 21
Where special circumstances exist, a court has broad discretion in shaping a
remedy to fit the controversy before it.2 32 If the misappropriation is found to
be wilful and malicious, a court may award exemplary damages not exceeding
218. Id. 353(b).
219. Id.
220. 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 835.
223. Id.




228. Id. 355. The right to attorney's fees exists when any claims are made or defended in bad
faith, or willful and malicious misappropriation occurs. Id.
229. Id. 354(a).
230. Id.
231. Id. For example, if company A misappropriates company B's trade secret, a computer
software package, the damages might not be readily ascertainable. It could be extremely difficult
for B to establish an amount of lost profit or the identity of lost customers due to A's wrongful act.
In these types of circumstances ITSA authorizes a court to order company A to pay B a "reasona-
ble royalty" based on the benefits derived from company A's use of the software. Id.
232. Marvin N. Benn, Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 27 PATENT, TRADEMARK. & COPYRIGHT No.
I, at I (Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Oct. 1987) (describing the remedies provided for in ITSA).
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twice the otherwise awardable sum.2"' ITSA also gives courts the authority to
award reasonable attorney's fees where it finds bad-faith claims or wilful and
malicious misappropriation.23' Lastly, section 6 of the Act gives a court clear
statutory power to grant protective orders during the pendency of trade secret
litigation,23 and to take any other reasonable means it deems necessary to
preserve the secrecy of the alleged trade secrets. 236
C. The Effect of ITSA on Existing Law
ITSA clearly deals with issues that, prior to its enactment, had been left to
common law principles. In order to clarify the effect that ITSA's provisions
would have on existing laws, the legislature included the following provision:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act is intended to displace
conflicting tort, restitutionary, unfair competition, and other laws of this
State providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret. 23 7
It was thus the express intent of the legislature to substantially displace preex-
isting tort remedies for the misappropriation of a trade secret.238 ITSA ex-
pressly displaces tort, restitutionary, unfair competition, and other Illinois
laws 239 providing for civil remedies for the misappropriation of a trade
secret.24 0
Although ITSA codifies and displaces tort causes of action, it does not affect
contractual remedies, civil remedies not based on the misappropriation of a
trade secret, and criminal penalties.2 1' As far as ITSA's effect on the contract
cause of action, the text of ITSA states:
This Act does not affect contractual remedies, whether or not based upon
the misappropriation of a trade secret, provided however, that a contractual
or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit use of a trade secret shall not be
deemed to be void or unenforceable solely for lack of a durational or geo-
233. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, T 354(b).
234. id. 355.
235. Id. 356. The purpose of the protective order is to maintain the item's status as a trade
secret. If during the course of discovery parties are allowed access to the trade secrets of their
opponents, litigation may become a tool to learn about a competitor's trade secrets. For an inter-
esting discussion of protective orders issued in the course of trade secret litigation, see W. Scott
Simmer, First Amendment Interests in Trade Secret, Private Materials, and Confidential Infor-
mation: The Use of Protective Orders in Defamation Litigation. 69 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1984).
236. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 356.
237. Id. 358(a).
238. Id.; see supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing the tort cause of action).
239. Although there is no legislative history on point, the comment on a similar provision in
UTSA, section 7, implies that this provision would allow the contract cause of action to survive
intact. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 14 U.L.A. 433, 463 (1990) ("This
Act . . . does not apply to a duty voluntarily assumed through an express or implied-in-fact
contract.").
240. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 358.
241. Id. 358(b)(l)-(3).
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graphical limitation on the duty.2""
This provision concerning the effect of ITSA on contractual remedies did not
appear in UTSA. In fact, of the thirty-six jurisdictions that have adopted a
version of UTSA, this provision is unique to Illinois. It was apparently in-
cluded to override the Disher"I and Cincinnati Tool"' line of cases that re-
quired reasonable time and geographical limitations to enforce a contractual
duty to maintain secrecy in a confidentiality agreement.2 5
III. ANALYSIS: CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY UNDER ITSA
The focus of this analysis is three-fold. First, ITSA will be compared and
contrasted with the Illinois common law. Second, confidentiality agreements
will be compared and contrasted with covenants not to compete. This analysis
will focus on the different policy concerns and implications of these two types
of agreements. Third, the section of ITSA concerning its effect on other Illi-
nois law will be examined in detail. Possible interpretations of the Act will be
discussed and a proposal for clarification will be advanced.
First this Comment will discuss how ITSA differs from common law. Where
applicable, courts' and commentators' interpretations of ITSA will be dis-
cussed. However, because ITSA is relatively new, few courts have had the
opportunity to interpret its provisions. In fact, to date only six Illinois appel-
late cases have been interpreted under the Act.24
6
A. What ITSA Does
ITSA serves two basic purposes. First, it codifies some of the common law
concerning trade secrets. The common law definition of a trade secret and
common law remedies for the misappropriation of trade secrets are both now
codified in ITSA. Second, in addition to codifying common law, ITSA pro-
vides for additional remedies against misappropriators.
242. Id. 358(b)(l).
243. Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (holding, as a matter of first
impression, that, to be enforceable, confidentiality agreements must contain reasonable time and
geographical restrictions on the duty not to disclose).
244. Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (holding confi-
dentiality agreement unenforceable given its unlimited durational and geographical scope).
245. Although there is no legislative history directly on point, the two principal draftsmen of
the act, .Melvin Jager and Marvin Benn, have both suggested that the legislature intended to
override Disher and Cincinnati Tool. See, e.g., Melvin F. Jager, Illinois Returns to the Main-
stream of Trade-Secret Protection. CBA RECORD, Oct. 1988, at 18; Benn, supra note 232, at I.
246. See Gillis Associated Indus. v. Oleska, 564 N.E.2d 881 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); Tie Sys., Inc.
v. Telcom Midwest, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1080 (II1. App. Ct. 1990); Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v.
Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Carbonic Fire Extinguishers, Inc. v. Heath, 547
N.E.2d 675 (111. App. Ct. 1989); Brostron v. Warmann, 546 N.E.2d 3 (II1. App. Ct. 1989); Ser-
vice Ctrs., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
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1. Codification of Common Law
ITSA's description of a trade secret consists of two separate parts. 247 First,
ITSA lists various subject matter capable of being protected as trade
secrets."4 8 Second, ITSA enumerates the two essential qualities that informa-
tion must have to actually receive the protection guaranteed with trade secret
status..24
9
The first part of the definition lists subject matter capable of being protected
as a trade secret.25 0 It is notable in that it follows the common law tradition in
Illinois by allowing trade secret protection for a wide range of items and, more
specifically, customer lists.25 The phrase "including but not limited to techni-
cal or non-technical data" reflects the past protection of nontechnical business
information as well as technical information. 25 2
In a similar vein, ITSA specifically mentions "lists of actual or potential
customers or suppliers" as examples of the type of information that can qual-
ify as a trade secret.2 54 This clearly addresses the question whether customer
lists, the subject of much trade secret debate, may be protectable trade
secrets.255 Illinois common law affords these items protection.
256
The definition of a trade secret in ITSA codifies two distinct requirements
for trade secret protection present under Illinois common law. First, under
section 352(d)(1), the information must be sufficiently secret to derive eco-
nomic value.25 7 Second, the information must be the subject of reasonable ef-
247. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text (discussing ITSA's definition of a trade
secret). In full, section 352(d) provides:
"trade secret" means information, including but not limited to, technical or non-tech-
nical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
drawing, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers,
that:
(i) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use; and
(2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy or confidentiality.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, T 352(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
248. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 352(d).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.; see supra note 208 (noting that customer lists are protectable trade secrets under
Illinois law).
252. See, e.g., Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865 (111. 1965) (customer list).
253. See, e.g., Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806 (I11. 1921) (chemical formula).
254. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 11 352(d).
255. Customer lists have often been characterized as on the periphery of trade secret law. How-
ever, in Illinois this has not been the case. See supra note 208 (noting that customer lists are
protectable trade secrets under both Illinois common law, and ITSA).
256. See Lincoln Towers Ins. Agency v. Farrell, 425 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (111. App. Ct. 1981)
(protecting an insurance company's list of clients as a trade secret).
257. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 352(d)(1).
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forts to maintain its secrecy.258
Using this definition of the Act, Illinois courts have held that financial docu-
ments showing the difference between a company's expenses and revenues
were trade secrets, 59 while a customer list that was readily obtainable in a
public directory, 260 a customer list that could almost be duplicated with little
expenditure of time or money, 21 and a pricing formula for a medical records
storage company, 62 were not.
ITSA was more recently interpreted in Gillis Associated Industries v. Cari-
All, Inc.218 In Cari-All, Mark Oleska, plaintiff Gillis' national sales manager,
left Gillis' employ and began working for Cari-All, the defendant, as Cari-
All's regional sales manager. 28' Gillis complained that upon leaving, Oleska
misappropriated its confidential customer list in violation of ITSA and ten-
dered it to the defendant who then began using it in competition with the
plaintiff.28 5
The Illinois appellate court held that the customer list was not a trade se-
cret.266 The court first discussed the economic value prong of the test, holding
that this prong was met because the list could only be developed by a competi-
tor after significant expenditures of time and money, such as targeted mailings
and/or telemarketing.167
The list, however, failed the "subject of secrecy" requirement.2 8 The evi-
dence that plaintiff produced at trial to show that he had taken adequate
safety measures to protect the secrecy of the customer list was insufficient.269
The plaintiff's failure to take any affirmative action to keep the list secret, the
inadequacy of internal and external security systems, and the apparent lack of
any employee confidentiality agreements and/or exit interviews imparting the
importance of confidentiality were all factors that led the Gillis court to con-
clude that the customer list in question was not deserving of trade secret
protection.2 70
An injunction was the traditional common law remedy for the misappropria-
tion of trade secrets in Illinois.2 7 ITSA now gives a court broad discretion in
awarding an injunction where either actual or threatened misappropriation
258. Id. 352(d)(2).
259. Brostron v. Warmann, 546 N.E.2d 3 (III. App. Ct. 1989).
260. Carbonic Fire Extinguishers, Inc. v. Heath, 547 N.E.2d 675 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
261. Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907 (111. App. Ct. 1990), appeal de-
nied, 567 N.E.2d 331 (111. 1991).
262. Service Ctrs., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132 (III. App. Ct. 1989).
263. 564 N.E.2d 881 (II1. App. Ct. 1990).
264. Id. at 881.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 886.
267. Id. at 883.
268. Id. at 886.
269. Id. at 885-86.
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (noting the widespread desire for injunc-
tive relief in trade secret cases).
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may occur.2"2 This is simply Illinois common law codified. 273
2. Provision of Additional Remedies
In addition to codifying the common law, ITSA provides additional reme-
dies not available at common law. ITSA allows a court to issue a limited in-
junction in special circumstances where a permanent injunction would be un-
reasonable due to "an overriding public interest. 2 74 In these instances, ITSA
allows courts to formulate a type of "licensing" agreement; the court is au-
thorized to issue an injunction conditioning future use of the trade secret upon
the payment of a reasonable royalty to the owner of the trade secret. 2"
Although there are no Illinois cases directly on point, the New York case of
Republic Aviation Corp. v. Schenk 7 illustrates the situation in which a court
may issue a section 3(b) remedy. In Schenk, the alleged trade secret was an
aircraft weapons control system that improved the security of the armed forces
in Vietnam.2 77 An overriding public interest existed with respect to the secur-
ity of United States troops in a foreign country. 78 Although the court declined
to issue an injunction prohibiting the disclosure and use of the trade secret, the
owner of the trade secret was entitled to an accounting to determine what
damages the plaintiff had occasioned from the defendant's wrongful appropri-
ation.2719 The plaintiff was also entitled to such further. accountings as would be
necessary to determine the damages occasioned by the defendant's future use
of the plaintiff's defense system.2 80
Furthermore, ITSA provides for more remedies than simply injunctions.
Under ITSA, a successful party may recover damages28' and, in some in-
stances, reasonable attorney fees.282 The recovery of damages is a substantial
modification to common law.283 For example, in Schenk,2 84 the defendant was
not able to prevent the plaintiff from initially using his trade secret. 28" An
injunction that merely prohibits the defendant from future use of the plain-
tiff's trade secret might be an insufficient remedy. 286 It does not compensate
272. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 353(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
273. See supra notes 157-76 and accompanying text (discussing the common law remedies for
trade secret misappropriation).
274. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 353(b).
275. Id.
276. 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 834.
279. Id. at 835.
280. Id.
281. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 354.
282. Id. 1 355.
283. Jager, supra note 245, at 21.
284. Schenk, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 830; see supra text accompanying notes 276-80 (discussing
the facts in Schenk).
285. Schenk, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 831.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 157-76 (discussing the need for injunctive relief in
trade secret cases).
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the plaintiff for the past harm.187 In circumstances such as these, ITSA allows
a court to award damages for both the actual loss caused by the misappropria-
tion and the unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation that is not
taken into account in computing the actual loss.288
B. Confidentiality Agreements vs. Covenants Not To Compete
ITSA should decrease the amount of uncertainty involved in trade secret
protection. The Act has not, however, eliminated uncertainty altogether. At
least one issue requires clarification. Businesspersons need to know what the
precise boundaries of contractual trade secret protection are in light of the
adoption of ITSA. As noted earlier, the Illinois courts attempted to address
this problem in Disher289 and Cincinnati Tool.2"' Those decisions equated the
contractual protection of trade secrets with covenants not to compete, 9 and
imposed upon contractual trade secret protection the requirements of time and
territorial limits.292 However, these decisions have failed to recognize the dif-
ferences that exist between these two types of contracts. A covenant not to
compete prohibits an individual from working in a certain position.28 3 A confi-
dentiality agreement simply limits the disclosure of certain information falling
in the category of trade secrets."" An individual bound to a confidentiality
agreement, but not to a covenant not to compete, is unrestricted in her pursuit
of the occupation of her choice. She simply must not disclose another's propri-
etary information.
Equating confidentiality agreements with covenants not to compete is inap-
propriate. First, confidentiality agreements and covenants not to compete serve
different policy considerations. Given the two different purposes of the agree-
ments, covenants not to compete should be temporally and geographically lim-
ited, while confidentiality agreements should not be. Second, protecting trade
secrets for only a limited period of time and within a specific geographical
area undermines the well-established irtentions of trade secret law-to en-
courage research and development and to discourage the misappropriation of
trade secrets.
Illinois courts have failed to recognize that confidentiality agreements and
covenants not to compete are justified by two separate policy considerations.2 95
Confidentiality agreements protect a person's right to her secret information,
287. See supra text accompanying notes 157-76 (discussing the urgent need for relief in trade
secret cases).
288. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 354(a).
289. Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639 (II1. App. Ct. 1984).
290. Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See infra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of covenants not
to compete).
294. See infra notes 297-98 and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of confiden-
tiality agreements).
295. Jager, supra note 245, at 18-19.
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trade secrets or otherwise. Often the person seeking protection has developed
the information at significant time and expense. Thus, trade secrets are pro-
tected to encourage research and development. If a person's efforts could be
simply usurped with the attrition of an employee, it is doubtful that anyone
would be willing to invest time and money in development. In the end, society
benefits from the protection of trade secrets. Protection encourages technologi-
cal advances. On the other hand, covenants not to compete simply protect an
individual from unwarranted competition. Most courts have implicitly recog-
nized this by requiring reasonable time and geographical restrictions on cove-
nants not to compete.
Covenants not to compete, if enforceable, may create illegal restraints in
trade and restrict employees from exercising a freedom of choice in their ca-
reers. 2 96 However, covenants not to disclose do not necessarily illegally restrain
trade or unduly restrict an employee's career choices. Suppose, for example,
that Dr. Brown, a Peoria resident and the only practicing physician specializ-
ing in orthopedic surgery in Peoria, joined a physician's group that required
him to sign an agreement restricting him from working within a sixty mile
radius of Peoria for a period of two years after he left the medical partnership.
Should Dr. Brown become dissatisfied with the partnership arrangement and
decide to leave he would have few meaningful local employment choices. To
pursue an occupation similar to that which he performed with the partnership,
he most likely must uproot his family and move to another city.
However, if he stays in Peoria he must quit his practice and the people of
Peoria may be left with one less doctor in the area. Enforcing this covenant
not to compete both restricts Dr. Brown's freedom to pursue a specific occupa-
tion and limits the choices that the citizens of Peoria will have.
Confidentiality agreements are dramatically different from covenants not to
compete. If Dr. Brown is merely prohibited from disclosing the partnership's
trade secrets, not only will he be able to remain in Peoria, but he will also be
able to practice medicine, providing Peoria residents with nearby medical ser-
vices. An employee has never been prevented from bringing to a subsequent
employer the general skills, knowledge, acquaintances and overall expertise ac-
quired during her tenure with a former employer.297 A confidentiality agree-
ment simply protects the old partners from the inequitable conversion of their
proprietary information.29 8
Second, decisions requiring temporal and geographical restrictions on confi-
dentiality agreements, simply because they are required for covenants not to
compete, violate the well-established principle that a trade secret has an indef-
296. See Kugler, supra note 29.
297. See supra notes 30-33 (discussing the tenets of trade secret law).
298. Granted this analysis may be a little too simplistic. However, the analysis is proper where
the trade secret gives the employee a competitive advantage. For this reason, the courts likened
covenants not to compete and confidentiality agreements and imposed temporal and/or geographi-
cal limitations on both types of restrictive covenants.
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inite life and economic value so long as it is kept secret.2 99 The requirement of
time and territorial limitations on an agreement prohibiting the disclosure of
trade secrets directly contradicts the definition of a trade secret itself."' As
long as the trade secret remains secret, it should be protected.301 A company's
trade secret does not automatically lose its value after, for example, the expi-
ration of a fixed period of time outside a certain location. A trade secret, as a
property right, should be protectable for as long as the item remains a trade
secret.302
In light of the above, then, a temporal limitation may make sense if linked
by expert testimony to the time required to independently develop the infor-
mation (outside the employment context). By contrast, geographical limita-
tions make no sense in nondisclosure agreements, but do make sense in a non-
competition agreement.
C. Section 8(b)(1) of ITSA
1. Has ITSA Overruled Disher?
Disher v. Fulgoni may or may not be overruled by section 8(b)(1) of ITSA.
However, how the practitioner should draft a confidentiality agreement largely
depends upon section 8(b)(1), which Disher played no small part in prompt-
ing. Whether Disher is overruled by ITSA, then, has certain ramifications for
the correct interpretation of the Act itself. If ITSA overrules Disher, then
certain presumptions concerning the proper interpretation of the Act may be
made and drafters of confidentiality agreements are given additional guidance
to the intended meaning of the Act.
The Illinois legislature, recognizing that it was essential to realize the
proper scope of contractual protection that should be afforded trade secrets in
Illinois, added 3 3 the provision in ITSA that states:
This law does not affect:
(1) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a
trade secret, provided however, that a contractual or other duty to maintain
secrecy or limit use of a trade secret shall not be deemed to be void or
unenforceable solely for lack of a duradonal or geographical limitation on
the duty .... 304
This language was arguably included to overrule Disher and the cases that
followed its reasoning.' 5 Although no definitive legislative history exists spe-.
cifically stating that the above provision overrules the Disher requirements,
two commentators, Melvin F. Jager and Marvin N. Benn, the principal drafts-
299. See Benn, supra note 232, at 1; Jager, supra note 245, at 18-19.
300. See Benn, supra note 232, at 1; Jager, supra note 245, at 18-19.
301. See Benn, supra note 232, at 1; Jager, supra note 245, at 18-19.
302. See Benn, supra note 232, at 1; Jager, supra note 245, at 18-19.
303. This provision was "added" in that it was not a part of UTSA.
304. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 358(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
305. See Benn, supra note 232, at 3; Jager, supra note 245, at 21.
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men of ITSA, have each indicated that this is the case. Mr. Benn writes:
Recently, there have been decisions in Illinois, which have been followed
in other states, that have severely limited and, in some experts' opinions,
severely misconstrued the common law of trade secrets in Illinois dealing
with the protection of trade secrets by contract. The Illinois act overrules
this Illinois decisional law that is inconsistent with the full recognition of the
property rights and public policies underlying trade secret laws.
Under the act, Illinois law will once again conform to the general trade
secret law and foster the public policies underlying trade secret law. The
property rights in a trade secret will therefore be protected by either a con-
tractual or non-contractual duty to maintain secrecy without time or territo-
rial limits, provided the other terms and provisions of the act are met." 6
Mr. Benn argues that if ITSA does not overrule Disher, there would have
been no reason for section 8(b)(1)'s inclusion in the Act.117 He argues that no
longer must contractual agreements contain reasonable time and territorial
limitations to be enforceable." 8
In a similar vein, Mr. Jager, Chairman of the Intellectual Property Section
Council that initiated the bill, writes:
A recent pair of appellate court decisions for the first time imposed time and
territorial limits on the contractual duty to protect trade secrets. Disher v.
Fulgoni, and Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed. Illinois protection for trade
secrets was thrown into a tailspin .... .
[A] major difference between the Uniform Act and the Illinois Act
arose out of the unique development in Illinois law represented by Disher v.
Fulgoni and Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed. Section 8(b)(i) of the Illi-
nois Act returns Illinois to the mainstream by declaring that "a contractual
or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit use of a trade secret shall not be
deemed void or unenforceable solely for lack of durational or geographical
limitation on the duty." Disher and its progeny are expressly overruled." 9
Both Benn and Jager have reasoned that contractual agreements must no
longer contain reasonable time and territorial limitations to be enforceable.
In spite of the above comments, however, arguments may be made that
Disher was not overruled by ITSA. First, the legislature never expressly over-
ruled the case. It would seem that before the legislature would overrule two
Illinois appellate decisions, it would thoughtfully argue the point-or at least
mention it for the record. Yet nowhere in the debates is the matter discussed.
Second, where a statute and case law can be interpreted as either consistent or
306. Benn, supra note 232, at 3.
307. UTSA provides that it does not affect the contract cause of action. ITSA, however, pro-
vides that it does not affect the common law contract cause of action except that contracts not to
disclose trade secrets are not void solely for lack of a temporal or geographical limitation. The
argument is that if ITSA did not affect Illinois common law, there would have been no need for
the inclusion of 8(b)(1) in the Act.
308. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 358(b)(1).
309. Jager, supra note 245, at 18, 21 (citations omitted).
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conflicting, it is appropriate to interpret the statute and case law as consis-
tent.31 If a court could interpret Disher as consistent with the Act it should do
so. Should a court interpret Disher and ITSA as consistent, the Act would not
overrule Disher. ITSA and Disher can be interpreted as consistent."' Thus,
the argument that ITSA in fact does not overrule Disher is compelling. Third,
the only direct authority for the proposition that ITSA overrules Disher are
the Benn and Jager articles. Although they may be correct, the authors fail to
cite any primary authority for their proposition. While both Mr. Benn and
Mr. Jager were involved in the drafting of the Act, the relevance of their
intentions does not rise to the same level as does those of the Illinois
legislators.3 2
Fourth, Perman v. ArcVentures, Inc., 3" decided after the effective date of
ITSA," 4 but not under it, made no mention of ITSA. This is especially nota-
ble in light of the fact that if the Act is interpreted as overruling Disher, the
court would have reached the opposite conclusion. In Perman, an Illinois ap-
pellate court held that a nondisclosure/confidentiality agreement was unrea-
sonable and unenforceable given its unlimited geographical and temporal
dimensions. 15 In Perman, the defendant Perman signed a confidentiality
agreement" 6 in which he agreed not to "during or after the term of [his]
employment disclose or in any way exploit any information . . ." of his em-
ployer. 17 The court, in language almost identical to that found in Disherl"
and Cincinnati Tool," 9 reasoned that because the agreement was unlimited in
its time and geographical dimensions, it was overly broad, unreasonable, and
thereby unenforceable. 20 Perman, in fact, relied specifically on Disher and
Cincinnati Tool.
If, however, ITSA overrules Disher, confidentiality agreements no longer
need contain time and geographical restrictions. Had this interpretation of the
Act been binding precedent, clearly the Perman Court would have reached a
different result. 32 1 Unable to rely on Disher, the court would not have been
310. See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.03, at 72 (Tem-
porary Pamphlet 1992) (noting that when a concept is established in common law, the courts
should presume that the legislature would have specifically provided so had it wished to abolish
the doctrine).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 309 and infra notes 324-31 for a discussion of how
Disher and the Act could be interpreted consistently.
312. Mr. Benn is the managing partner in the 'Chicago law firm of Hamman & Benn. Mr.
Jager is a partner in the Chicago firm of Willian Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson & Lione.
313. 554 N.E.2d 982 (I1. App. Ct. 1990).
314. ITSA became effective January 1, 1988. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 1 359 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1991).
315. Perman, 554 N.E.2d at 986.
316. The consideration for the agreement was his continued employment. id. at 984.
317. Id.
318. Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (I1. App. Ct. 1984).
319. Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170, 175 (I1. App. Ct. 1985).




free to ignore the express provisions of the Act. Therefore, the confidentiality
agreement in Perman, without temporal and geographical restrictions, would
be enforceable, and Perman would have been enjoined. However, although not
binding precedent, ITSA was not even mentioned in Perman. It seems unlikely
that the court would cite a case that had been overruled without mentioning
why reliance on it would be justified in the particular instance at hand. One
explanation for why the court made no mention of the Act is that it did not
consider Disher overruled.
In any event, whether or not Disher is overruled is unclear at best. Achieve-
ment of the ends that trade secret law seeks to promote-the maintenance of
commercial morality and encouragement of innovation and inven-
tion 22-- requires that this guidance be clear.
2. Remaining Ambiguities of Section 8(b)(1)
It is unclear whether ITSA overrules Disher. Although that issue requires
clarification, it is not the only barrier to an unencumbered interpretation of
the Act. At least two other issues remain. First, it is unclear whether section
8(b)(1) validates contracts without any limitations in them, or whether it vali-
dates only those agreements containing only one of the two possible limitations
(geographical or temporal). Second, it is unclear what role the lack of a limi-
tation or limitations may play in invalidating the contract.
a. One or neither?
Whether a contract without any temporal or geographical limitations is
valid is still open to debate. Section 8(b)(1) may be interpreted in one of two
ways. It may be interpreted to require neither a geographical nor a temporal
limitation; or it may be interpreted to require only one such restriction. If the
former is true, a confidentiality agreement need contain neither time nor terri-
torial restrictions. Under this interpretation, the confidentiality agreement in
Perman,323 prohibiting disclosure at any time to any person, would be enforce-
able. If the latter is true, however, confidentiality agreements that prohibit
disclosure of trade secrets anywhere at any time will not be enforceable.
Under this latter interpretation, enforceability requires that these agreements
contain either a time or a territorial restriction. For example, the Perman
agreement, containing no restrictions whatsoever, would be unenforceable be-
cause of its overbreadth. However, an agreement that either prohibited disclos-
ure for a reasonably limited time, or prohibited disclosure within a reasonably
specific area, would survive the court's scrutiny.
To determine the appropriate interpretation, it is necessary to examine sec-
tion 8(b)(1) in two separate contexts. First, the plain language of the Act will
be examined using statutory construction principles as a guide to interpreta-
322. See Rosenbluth, supra note 15, at 161.
323. See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text (describing the agreement in Perman).
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tion. Second, the clause will be interpreted according to its relationship to
Disher.
b. Statutory construction principles as a guidepost
The plain language of the Act reads, "[The contract will not be void] solely
for lack of a durational or geographical limitation."" 4 The issue is whether
neither a durational nor a geographical restriction is necessary, or only one of
the restrictions is necessary. The focus is on the word "or." Presumably, the
drafters chose that word over the conjunctive word "and." "Or" clauses are
read in the disjunctive, while "and" clauses are read in the conjunctive.3 ,
Had the statute read that the contract would not be void solely for lack of a
durational and geographical limitation, then clearly, read in the conjunctive,
neither limitation would have been required. In such a case, a confidentiality
agreement with neither type of limitation would not be invalid because it
lacked a durational and a geographical restriction. Under this alternative for-
mulation of the statute, the agreement in Perman would have been valid.
However, the legislature did not choose this formulation of the statute. In-
stead of the conjunctive word "and," they chose the disjunctive "or." Read,
then, in the disjunctive, the following rule emerges: A contract will not be void
solely for lack of a durational limitation, or solely for lack of a geographical
limitation. Under this formulation, at least one of the limitations must be con-
tained in a confidentiality agreement for it to be enforceable. An agreement
with neither a time nor a geographical restriction would not be valid. For al-
though a contract will not be void solely for lack of one of the restrictions, lack
of both a durational and a geographical restriction is not addressed by the
statute, and under Disher, the lack of both 'estrictions voids the contract.3 '2
The legislators' use of the term "solely" also gives context to the statute's
interpretation. Read in the disjunctive, a contract will not be void solely for
lack of a durational limitation or solely for lack of a geographical limitation
on the duty not to disclose. Use of the term "solely" focuses even more on the
separation of the two limitations. It suggests that lack of a geographical limi-
tation may not be the "sole" reason a confidentiality agreement is void. Fur-
ther, a contract may not be rendered void "solely" because it has no dura-
tional limitation. This suggests that, in the aggregate, the absence of both a
durational and a geographical restriction may be enough justification to void
the agreement. Arguably, the word "solely," in combination with the disjunc-
tive word "or," isolates the limitations 'and addresses the instance in which
only one of them-not both-is absent.
Considering then the choice of the disjunctive "or," over the conjunctive
word "and," and the use of "solely," an argument may be made that an agree-
324. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 358(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
325. SINGER. supra note 310, § 21.14, at 127.
326. If ITSA is consistent with Disher, it validates only those agreements containing either a
durational or a geographical restriction.
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ment containing neither limitation may be void. Under this interpretation, the
Act renders enforceable only those agreements that include at least one of the
limitations. Thus, under this analysis, at least one or the other-a geographi-
cal or durational limitation-must be included to save the agreement.
c. Disher as a guidepost
Section 8(b)(1)'s relationship to Disher, if in fact there is one, also gives
context and guidance to the correct interpretation of section 8(b)(1) itself.
Again, the plain words of the statute leave the clause open to interpretation.
Either a contract without either limitation is valid, or at least one limitation is
required to save a confidentiality agreement. To determine the appropriate in-
terpretation, it is necessary to reexamine the facts and, specifically, the confi-
dentiality agreement in Disher3 2 7
The agreement that Disher signed did not contain any mention of either a
territorial or temporal restriction. 28 Disher was precluded from disclosing
trade secrets and other confidential information "to any third party." '329 Also,
the agreement included this statement: "This agreement of confidentiality will
survive my employment at IRI." 330 This implies an agreement unlimited in
time .3
Given this language and starting with the presumption that section 8(b)(1)
overrules Disher, there is only one possible interpretation of the clause's re-
quirements for an enforceable contractual duty not to disclose. Because the
clause reads, "solely for lack of a durational or geographic limitation," one
must conclude that the legislature, if it intended to overrule Disher, meant to
require neither time nor geographical restrictions. This is the only interpreta-
tion that would render the Disher agreement enforceable, as that agreement
had neither type of restriction. Thus, beginning with the presumption that
Disher is indeed overruled, ITSA must be interpreted to require neither time
nor geographical restrictions.
However, one may argue that Disher may not be overruled . 32 If Disher is
not overruled, the confidentiality agreement in Disher, which had neither a
temporal nor a geographical restriction, would still be unenforceable under
ITSA. For ITSA to be interpreted consistently with Disher, it must be inter-
preted to require either a temporal or a geographical limitation. Under this
interpretation, the Disher agreement would still be unenforceable as it con-
tained no restrictions on the duty not to disclose. However, had the agreement
included either of the limitations, it would have been enforceable. If this is the
327. See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of
Disher).




332. See supra notes 310-20 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning in support of this
theory).
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case-that ITSA requires either limitation-then Disher remains good law,
and agreements with neither of the restrictions are invalid. Notably, however,
the argument that either one of the limitations is necessary to save the agree-
ment is contingent upon Disher not being overruled.
In sum, if Disher is overruled, ITSA requires neither a time nor a geograph-
ical limitation on a contractual duty not to disclose trade secrets. However, if
Disher is not overruled, then ITSA must be interpreted to require either a
time or a geographical limitation on a contractual duty not to disclose trade
secrets.
d. The "solely" argument
Another ambiguity exists in ITSA. The text of ITSA provides that "a con-
tractual or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit use of a trade secret shall
not be deemed to be void or unenforceable solely for lack of a durational or
geographical limitation on the duty."'33 Use of the word "solely" opens up the
clause to two additional possible interpretations. First, "solely" could mean
that the courts are still free to employ the usual defenses, such as lack of
consideration 3 ' or duress, 36 to invalidate; a confidentiality agreement. But the
courts would not be free to invalidate such agreements "solely" on the basis of
the absence of time and/or geographical restraints.3 For example, a court
may never invalidate an agreement on the grounds that it was unlimited in
durational or geographical scope. However, if the contract was one of adhe-
sion, the court could invalidate it on that basis. The effect is to eliminate an
overly broad durational or geographical scope of the agreement as a defense to
the agreement, while preserving the usual contract defenses.
The other possible interpretation is that "solely" means that lack of time
and geographical restraints may not be the "sole" reason a court invalidates a
confidentiality agreement but that the absence of such a provision may be a
factor considered with other factors to invalidate the agreement. For example,
a court may not invalidate a confidentiality agreement on the grounds that it
contains no durational restriction. But, the lack of restriction, in addition to an
overly broad list of trade secrets, or some other compelling circumstance, in
addition to the lack of restriction may be used as a basis to invalidate the
nondisclosure agreement.
IV. IMPACT
ITSA will have at least three aggregate effects on future Illinois trade secret
333. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, 351-359 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
334. See, e.g., Crum v. Krol, 425 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (finding that there
was sufficient consideration to uphold the contract).
335. See, e.g., Herget Nat'l Bank v. Thede, 537 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (hold-
ing that the defendant had established a prima fazie defense of economic duress).
336. See supra notes 323-32 and accompanying text (discussing which of the two is the proper
interpretation).
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litigation. First, the Act provides improved stability in this area of the law. It
returns Illinois to the "mainstream" of trade secret law. In addition to the
availability of additional remedies for trade secret misappropriation, trade
secrets, now codified by definition under the Act, will be more readily ascer-
tainable. Cases interpreting the definition under the Act will now be decided
more uniformly. Similarly, cases decided under another state's version of the
Uniform Act may provide additional guidance where Illinois decisional prece-
dent is sparse.
Second, if section 8(b)(1) is interpreted to require either time or territorial
limits on the duty not to disclose trade secrets, 337 Illinois might have to face
the possibility of businesses declining to locate and/or expand in the state due
to a lack of sufficient protection of trade secrets. In this age of instant world-
wide communication and competition, it is incredible that Illinois would limit
the contractual protection for valuable trade secrets to, for example, Cook and
DuPage County or for three years. 88 These limitations, although quite appro-
priate for covenants not to compete, are not appropriate for confidentiality
agreements protecting trade secrets.3"' No well-advised new research business
would locate in Illinois if that business' trade secrets would be less than well
protected. Some facilities might decline to expand, or might even relocate, if
faced with the possibility that their trade secrets might receive less protection
in Illinois.
Third, those seeking to contractually protect trade secrets must pay atten-
tion to the drafting aspects of these agreements. In particular, the agreement
should pay attention to two areas-the identification of trade secrets and the
scope of protection that the agreement provides. Although ITSA sets out the
statutory definition of a trade secret,340 one should not simply name any con-
ceivably protectable information in a confidentiality agreement and hope that
the court decides that the information will qualify as a trade secret.34" ' The
more specifically a confidentiality agreement sets forth the precise items con-
sidered to be trade secrets, the more likely a court will protect them as such.342
Because Illinois, unlike most other states, does not "blue pencil" agreements of
this type,34 3 it is vital that only proprietary information be included.3 4
337. See supra notes 323-32 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood of this
interpretation).
338. See Benn, supra note 232, at 1; Jager, supra note 245, at 21.
339. See supra notes 28-302 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between cove-
nants not to compete and covenants not to disclose).
340. See supra note 247 (noting that ITSA codified the definition of a trade secret).
341. Aside from identifying information as a trade secret, it is also necessary to treat the infor-
mation as confidential to insure protection.
342. Although trade secrets are often an important part of a nondisclosure agreement, it should
be noted that non-trade secrets may also be contractually protected. When trade secrets and non-
trade secrets are protected in the same agreement, they should be separately identified. Also, a
severability clause is essential to realize the fullest protection of all the information.
343. See, e.g., Klubeck v. Division Medical X-Ray, Inc., 439 N.E.2d 506, 510 (I11. App. Ct.
1982) (noting that, while the intent of the parties always governs, the separate clauses of a con-
tract bargained for as a whole are generally not severable).
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A second caveat is that, although it seems likely that the Illinois legislature
intended to require neither time nor geographical restrictions on contractual
duties not to disclose trade secrets, at least one Illinois appellate court seems
to have sidestepped what is arguably the legislature's intentions. Although this
issue is ripe for a definitive answer from the Supreme Court of Illinois,3' 5 per-
haps for the moment the wary drafter might include either a time or geo-
graphical limitation. If it is relatively reasonable to project the length of time
in the particular area a trade secret is likely to have continued vitality, it
might be especially wise to include the less restrictive of the two. Also, given
the potential conflict between Disher and ITSA, the wise drafter should in-
clude a severability clause in the agreement.
CONCLUSION
Illinois trade secret doctrine is elusive at best. ITSA, while not without am-
biguity itself, is a step in the right direction towards clarifying a confusing and
complicated body of law. ITSA not only offers a workable definition of a trade
secret, but also provides a trade secret owner with a variety of remedies to
meet her specific needs. These remedies are especially important in that the
provisions for allowing attorney's fees and. damages, in addition to injunctions,
will provide a larger group of persons with access to the judicial system to seek
redress of trade secret wrongs. The illumination that ITSA provides in these
areas, however, is somewhat offset by the ambiguities present in the provisions
of ITSA expressing the legislature's intended effect of the Act on contractual
agreements not to disclose trade secrets.
Illinois courts confuse the issue by blurring the distinctions between non-
competition and nondisclosure agreements. Although the Illinois legislature
made an attempt to rectify the situation through adoption of ITSA, that at-
tempt continues to be aborted by post-ITSA decisions that continue to impose
tirfie and geographical limitations on agreements to protect the nondisclosure
of trade secrets and other confidential information.
A conservative drafting approach would subject trade secret protection to a
writing with some limitation imposed on the scope of nondisclosure. Certainly
the propriety of including a time and/or a geographical limitation on a con-
tractual duty not to disclose is subject to debate.
Illinois courts must continue to focus on clarifying the relationship between
ITSA enforcement and the contractual protection of confidential information.
This clarification may be necessary in a highly competitive environment to
avoid business relocation out of Illinois to states allowing unlimited protection,
344. Not only will an overinclusive list compromise the entire agreement, but it might result in
unnecessary administrative costs as well. See Hautman & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 254.
345. No court has yet been faced with interpreting a confidentiality agreement for trade secrets
under ITSA. In the meantime, drafters of confidentiality agreements should take a cautious
approach.
1992] PROTECTING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 925
while accomplishing ITSA's dual purposes of maintaining commercial moral-
ity and encouraging innovation and invention.
Caroline Patricia Jamieson

